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DECISION FACTORS INFLUENCING STIMULANT USE AMONG FIGHTER AIRCREW 
DURING COMBAT OPERATIONS 
 
Russell K. Gore M.D. 
U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory 
Dayton, OH 
Eric D. Hermes M.D. 
Yale University Department of Psychiatry 
New Haven, CT 
 
During long combat missions in fighter aircraft, passive in-flight fatigue 
countermeasures are often not feasible.  As a result, stimulant medications (Go 
Pills) may be used in-flight.  The present study attempts to describe the 
individual decision factors influencing stimulant use during combat operations.  
Methods:  35 deployed F-15E aircrews participated in this study.  Prior to the 
deployment, interviews were conducted to identify factors influencing the in-
flight decision to use stimulants.  Based on this qualitative information, a novel 
survey instrument was developed.  Results:  Surveys were completed after 111 
sorties.  Results were summarized graphically.  Conclusions:  Active and 
anticipated in-flight fatigue were the most common decision factors across all 
groups.   Leadership influence and perceived repercussions were the least 
influential.  Previous Go Pill experiences and in-flight performance were more 
influential among sorties using stimulants (p<0.001).  There were no notible 
differences in decision factors across deployment experience.          
 
During continuous operations, like those underway in the current combat theater, fatigue 
represents a significant concern among military aircrews.  In a recent survey, 74% of US Air 
Force aircrews reported flying when drowsy enough to fall asleep (Tan, 2006).  Specifically 
among fighter aircrews, counteracting fatigue is a continuous challenge.  During long combat 
missions, fighter aircrews perform complex physical, cognitive, and emotional tasks without the 
ability to use passive in-flight fatigue countermeasures.  These aircrews, flying in single-piloted 
tactical aircraft, cannot depend on in-flight napping, activity breaks, or increased cockpit lighting 
to counteract fatigue (J. A. Caldwell et al., 2009).  Often, when passive countermeasures are not 
feasible, stimulant medications (Go Pills) are used to improve in-flight vigilance.   
The use of stimulants is highly regulated and only authorized “after all other fatigue 
management tools have been exhausted” (Murray, USAF Policy Letter, 2001).  Nevertheless, 
stimulant use in combat is commonplace with 60-65% of fighter and bomber aircrews reporting 
stimulant use at least once during combat deployments (Emonson & Vanderbeek, 1995; Kenagy, 
Bird, Webber, & Fischer, 2004).  Prior to combat deployments aircrews are required to ground 
test stimulant medications and attend informal training about stimulant use from the squadron 
flight surgeon.  The authors conducting this study served as fighter squadron flight surgeons and 
frequently provided this training for combat aircrews.  During these training sessions, many 
aircrews deploying for the first time were noted to ask “when should I take the Go Pill during a 
combat sortie?”   
Many studies have investigated stimulant use in controlled research environments  
(Bower & Phelan, 2003; J. Caldwell, Caldwell, JL, Darlington, KK, 2003; John A. Caldwell, 
Caldwell, Smith, & Brown, 2004).  However, the decision to use stimulants in these studies is 
generally controlled as part of the study protocol.  In combat, the individual aircrew decision to 
use stimulants is based on a complex series of in-flight considerations.  Military regulations do 
not specify criteria for in-flight stimulant use and operational fatigue studies addressing this 
question are few.  One study evaluating stimulant use in fighter pilots during the initial phase of 
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Operation Desert Storm reported that aircrews were instructed to use stimulants “30 min before 
critical stages of flight if they felt unduly fatigued” (Emonson & Vanderbeek, 1995).  Another 
study of fighter pilot fatigue countermeasures recommends preflight planning of stimulant use in 
order to avoid a “real-time, fatigue-impaired decision about go-pill use” (Schultz & Miller, 2004).  
Given the lack of specific guidance and the variability of advice proffered in the operational 
literature, the present study attempts to describe the aircrew decision to use stimulants in-flight 




This study sought to investigate the complex decision to use or not use stimulants during 
combat operations.  Approval for the project was obtained from the Wright-Site Institutional 




In 2006, an F-15E fighter squadron deployed to a forward operating location in 
Southwest Asia.  During this combat deployment, F15E crews consisting of a pilot and a weapons 
systems officer (WSO) flew regular combat missions over Iraq and Afghanistan.  The use of 
stimulants during this deployment was authorized in accordance with USAF policy.  Aircrews 
were allowed to consume either five or ten milligrams (mg) of Dexedrine every four hours or 200 
mg of Modafinil every eight hours.  During the study period, participants were encouraged to 
complete a post flight survey as frequently as possible after each combat mission.  The decision 
to use or not use in-flight stimulants was assessed using the novel survey instrument described 




Prior to the deployment, detailed interviews were conducted with six experienced F-15E 
aircrew in order to develop a novel survey instrument.  These interviews were conducted to refine 
our understanding of the factors influencing the individual decision to use in-flight stimulants 
during combat operations.  Based on the qualitative information gathered, we identified 15 
primary categories of influence including previous Go Pill experiences, active in-flight fatigue, 
anticipated in-flight fatigue, preflight fatigue, habit patterns, personal convictions, planned sortie 
profile, Go Pill availability, crewmate influence, in-flight workload, in-flight performance, 
perceived repercussions, flight leadership influence, post flight medication effects and command 
influence.  For each category, descriptive statements were developed based on the initial aircrew 
interviews.  Using appropriate descriptive statements, parallel surveys were developed for sorties 
using stimulants and for sorties not using stimulants.  Figure 1 is an example illustrating the 
questions contained in these parallel surveys.  After landing, participants selected the appropriate 
survey and reported on a visual analog scale the level to which each category influenced their 




Survey responses were compared across stimulant use and aviator combat experience 
using univariate measures of analysis.  Results were summarized graphically based on the mean 
visual analog scale response.  For the purposes of this study, a “sortie” was defined as each 
individual aircrew survey completed.  Although some aircrews completed multiple surveys, we 





For the following statements, rate the extent to which each factor influenced your 
decision to USE the Go-pill during this sortie. 
 
1. In-flight Active fatigue–I felt tired/sleepy/sluggish or I was having difficulty staying 





For the following statements, rate the extent to which each factor influenced your 
decision to NOT USE the Go-pill during this sortie. 
 
1. In-flight Active fatigue–I felt rested and alert so I did not need to take the Go-pill.              
________________________________________________________________________ 
Figure 1.  Example of survey instrument questions portraying the “In-flight Active Fatigue” 
category for sorties in which stimulants were used (A) and sorties in which stimulants were not 






The survey population consisted of 35 aircrews, 17 pilots and 18 WSOs, with a mean age 
of 30 ± 4 yr (range 25 to 41).  There were 16 participants with previous combat experience and 19 
deploying to combat for the first time.  Among the 35 participants, 29 (82.9%) completed a 
survey after at least one sortie and 18 participants (51.4%) completed surveys after more than one 
sortie (range 2 to 14 surveys completed).  Of the 111 sorties surveyed, the mean sortie duration 




Figure 2 summarizes the survey results compared across stimulant use displayed in the 
order of influence for sorties using stimulants.  The active and anticipated in-flight fatigue 
categories were strong decision factors for both groups.  Stimulant users report that their decision 
was more influenced by previous Go Pill experiences (p<0.001) and in-flight performance 
(p<0.001).  Sorties not using stimulants reported more influence for the preflight fatigue category 



















Figure 2.  Mean survey responses [avg (SD)] comparing sorties using stimulants and sorties not 
using stimulants.  * Tests of statistical significance for univariate differences between sorties 
using stimulants and not using stimulants were based on Analysis of Variance. Categories 
showing significance at p<0.05 were Previous Go Pill Experiences, In-Flight Performance and 
Preflight Fatigue.   
 
Figure 3 summarizes the survey results compared across deployment experience 
displayed in order of influence for aircrew with deployment experience.  Again, active and 
anticipated in-flight fatigue were the most influential categories for both groups.  There were no 
significant differences between experienced combat aviators and those deployed for the first time.  
It is notable that the categories reported as the least influential across all groups were command, 




 Among fighter aircrews engaged in combat, the decision to use in-flight stimulants was 
primarily influenced by preflight and in-flight fatigue as well as in-flight performance 
decrements.  Fighter aircrews were not preplanning stimulant use based mission type and 
anticipated sortie duration (sortie profile) or personal habit patterns.  These results indicate that 
the decision to use stimulants was in line with the guidance prescribed by Emonson and 
Vanderbeek, suggesting that aircrews use stimulants if they experience excessive in-flight fatigue 
(Emonson & Vanderbeek, 1995).   Although anticipated fatigue was statistically as strong as 
active fatigue in this analysis, both of these factors involve an in-flight assessment of fatigue 
rather than a preflight decision.   
The decision to use in-flight stimulants was not influenced by aircrew experience.  This 
result indicates that aircrew strategies for in-flight stimulant use do not change with combat 
experience.  Due to the lack of formal guidance, this suggests that these strategies are either 
intuitive or communicated informally to new aircrews through observation.  Additionally, 

















































experience.  This study did not include a measure of aircrew performance to specifically evaluate 
the benefits of different stimulant use strategies.  Additional studies evaluating performance may 
reveal strategies, or decision category priorities, that improve combat performance. 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Figure 3.  Mean survey responses [avg (SD)] comparing survey responses from aircrews with 
previous combat experience and aircrews deployed to combat for the first time.  Tests of 
statistical significance for univariate differences were based on Analysis of Variance.  No 
significant differences were found.   
 
Aircrews made the decision to use in-flight stimulants with minimal influence of 
squadron leadership and minimal concern for post flight repercussions, allowing them to 
prioritize other decision factors.  This finding was consistent across stimulant use and combat 
experience.  Similarly, aircrews in other combat studies have reported minimal “pressure” to use 
stimulants during long duration missions (Kenagy et al., 2004).  These findings contradict media 
reports suggesting that aviators are occasionally coerced into stimulant use by commanders 
(Halbfinger, 2003).  These findings also contradict the general perception within the fighter 
community that commanders discourage stimulant use in combat.  During this deployment, the 
lack of leadership influence likely results from local command policies regarding stimulant use.  
Specifically, stimulant use was approved in advance for the duration of the deployment, there 
were no command directed limitations, and stimulant medications were readily available.   
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